Monday 27 April 2009

Text book economics and keeping President Hoover in mind.

First of all our apologies for the delay of this article as it was supposed to be published last week but it got delayed due to unforeseen events. Apparently there are still fat tail curves all over the place. Nevertheless the subject we discuss remains very topical. This week we examine the efficiency of quantitative easing and the continuous danger of taking the wrong policy measures, with the mistakes made by President Hoover during the 1930s in the back of our mind. The decision of the Brown Administration taken last week could potentially be a similar mistake only making the ongoing crisis more difficult to fix.

Quite a lot has been written about it already and this debate will surely dominate the economic agenda in the years ahead. Lately we have been criticized over this exact issue as well as we have been talking about the risk of deflation for more than 10 months now. Until last week, especially in the UK, we were being questioned that despite our negative outlook pure deflation had not yet crystallised compared to three or four Eurozone countries and the US. A major explanation for this is that the UK could ease the deflationary pressures over the last six to eight months due to a devaluation of its currency.

However if we take a look at the pace of inflation dropping from nearly 5% a year ago to 0% in February this would fit well into the definition of the Australian School of Economics as deflation as well. Figure 1 illustrates the deflationary pressures in the UK very well. How much more do you need? In the meantime from the month of March onwards the UK has joined the other countries as well. The Retail Price Index (RPI) showed a contraction by -0.4%.

Bear in mind, deflation is a slow process comparable to the interest rate policy of a central bank. When for example the Fed would hike or cut interest rates, the effects of this move will only show up in the economy the earliest nine months down the line if not longer. The same argument goes for a deflationary process, and having a look at the chart this process still went pretty fast if you are asking us.

Figure 1 UK Retail Price Index



© Bloomberg L.P. Used with permission. Visit www.bloomberg.com

Going forward the debate will be whether the substantial quantitative easing and build up of public debt by governments all over the world will have inflationary consequences. Sooner or later that may well be the case. This is also the ultimate objective of central banks, to inject inflation into their respective economies by quantitative easing.

But if we have a look at what happened in history or go back to our elementary textbooks of economics we get indications that inflation will be more something for later on. The latter will be a topic we will discuss in one of our next newsletters as there is a lot to be said about the over/under shooting of central banks’ monetary policy.

Let us assume for a moment that inflation would start rising again during the ongoing recession or let’s even for a while join the camp of the optimists and assume we are in the early phase of an economic recovery. If so this would automatically hamper the economic expansion and push the economy back into recession. The reason for that is unemployment and manufacturing capacity utilisation. Both have been dropping to historic lows, which is a logic phenomenon in severe recessions. (Figure 2)

Figure 2: US Manufacturing Capacity Utilisation on a monthly basis



Source: Federal Reserve, March 2009

Let us further assume that inflation would start to rise from this point onwards. Given the high level of unemployment, wages would be lagging inflation substantially. As a consequence real household income would decline and further depress consumer spending. This is the ultimate feature of deflation.

Also basic economics support this intuitive thinking. The mechanics of excess labour and production can be explained by looking at the Aggregate Supply and Demand Curve. (Figure 3)

Figure 3 Aggregate Supply and Demand Curve in periods of over capacity


GDP in Trillions

Source: Van R. Hoisington and Lacy H. Hunt

Inflation will not commence until the Aggregate Demand (AD) Curve shifts outward sufficiently to reach the part of the Aggregate Supply (AS) curve that is upward sloping. The AS curve is perfectly elastic or horizontal when substantial excess capacity occurs. Excess capacity puts pressure on companies to lay off staff, cut wages and other costs. Since wage and benefit costs are approximately about 70% of the cost of production, the AS curve will shift outward, meaning that prices will be lower at every level of AD. Therefore, multiple outward shifts in the Aggregate Demand curve will be required before the economy encounters an upward sloping Aggregate Supply Curve and as a consequence creating higher price levels. And this can only take place when household incomes start to rise again. In our opinion such a process will take a lot of time. If we look at what happened to Japan, they had a similar problem which turned into ... The Lost Decade.

Then there is the mainstream argument that the monetary efforts by central banks in general and the Federal Reserve more in particular will raise the risk of inflation considerably. One cannot deny that for example the Fed is expanding its balance sheet to unseen levels in an attempt to push the money supply M2 back up to acceptable levels. Unfortunately until now these efforts did not have any effect on new lending efforts by banks or economic growth.

The problem with this is that M2 is influenced by a number of factors which lay outside the power of a central bank. For instance the public's preference for checking accounts versus their preference for holding currency or time and saving deposits and the bank's needs for excess reserves have an impact on M2. This is also known as the multiplier of money and a central bank has hardly any grip on these parameters.

Having a closer look at the data from the Fed, the total money reserve increased by approximately $ 736 bln. However the excess of reserves went up almost as much, which is $ 722 bln. This caused a significant drop of the money multiplier. (Figure 4)
As a consequence only $ 14 bln of the increase in money reserves was available for lending. This in turn explains in part the significant drop in bank lending over the last two quarters.

Figure 4 M2 Money Multiplicator and Excess Reserves


Source: Federal Reserve Bank

The point we are trying to make here is that sometimes it is naive to assume that considerable expansion of reserves by a central bank (in our example the Fed) is inflationary.

Economic activity can not move forward unless credit expansion follows reserves expansion. This is not happening. Too much and poorly financed debt has rendered monetary policy ineffective.

The Fed did succeed until now in moving up the absolute amount of M2. They had to as M2 was created by the official and shadow banking system over the past couple of years. The latter though is in the midst of a deleveraging process and as a result the Fed has to take over this role.

But only printing of money will not be enough to generate new economic growth. Economic growth represented by GDP can be formulated as follow:

GDP = M2 * V ( )

A central bank will only manage to generate extra growth by increasing the amount of money in case that V remains stable. However if we look at the behaviour of V in times of recessions we see a substantial drop in frequency. (Figure 5) The reason for that is that V is determined by the amount of leverage the banking sector is able to use. This in turn is influenced by financial innovation. We know by now that financial innovation is put back in to the refrigerator and will not come out of it for the next couple of years.

Figure 5 Velocity of Money 1900-2008

Source: Federal Reserve


If we assume that the Shadow Banking system will have more deleveraging ahead, we can conclude that V has further to drop. As a result this can only mean one thing, in order to support economic growth (and this is an explicit mandate for the Federal Reserve) the quantitative easing will not be limited towards the $ 300 bln that was announced last month. Similar like the TARP I, II (and perhaps III and IV) we will see QE I and QE II, III in the next quarters ahead.

All this because a central bank can not control the velocity of money. This also means that the balance sheet expansion, which stands at astronomical levels already, has further to go.

There is also a paradoxical thought in this. We all agree the lessons to be learned from the ongoing Great Credit Crisis are the lack of regulation or de-regulation that took place at the end of the latest boom cycle. Policy makers are eager to increase regulation again for the banking industry and preferably also hedge funds. This with the goal to tame the unnecessary or imprudent use of financial innovation.

However if history is right this entails a paradoxical twist to conventional wisdom. Regulation should be the tightest when leverage is increasing rapidly, but lax in the face of deleveraging.

A similar argument can be made about tax policies. During times of prosperity and flourishing economic growth it is more rational to increase taxes. In times of economic downturns or recessions it is more advisable to lower taxes in order to support disposable income.

Taxes in general always have an effect on price development. In our case when we talk about taxes we refer to income taxes. A sales tax or VAT has an upward price effect. A rising income tax however will have a decreasing effect on prices as consumer demand is cut.

Corporate taxes however are a different story but give the same end result. They allow interest rates to be deductable and as a consequence stimulate debt-financing. In the current environment of de-leveraging it would be more appropriate to promote corporate tax cuts to digest the excesses which have been built up over the last decade.

The problem in the current crisis is a massive / structural build up of public deficits among governments around the world. Politicians are usually tempted to increase taxes to get their household finances back under control. Unfortunately these are the wrong tools to get us out of the crisis. In one of our earlier newsletters we already referred to the crucial policy mistakes made during the Great Depression of the 1930s by President Hoover which made the crisis only worse.

What did we see from the UK Government this week when they presented their budget plans for the current and next fiscal year? They announced a revision of their tax system and increased the income tax from 40 % to 50 % and a 10% rise on national insurance for salaries above £ 100,000.

The consequences of this move will be catastrophic for the UK economy. Socialists will argue this will only affect the 5% rich of the population as only the happy few earn £100,000 + salaries. The problem with this initiative however is that this is a hidden agenda to punish the bankers for the turmoil we are in.

Unfortunately one of the side effects of increasing income taxes to astronomical levels, and the UK tax revision can certainly be categorized as one ( salaries above £ 100,000 will have a tax rate of 60%), is tax avoidance. This group that is targeted is highly mobile and will re-locate to other more tax friendly regions. The only result by imposing such tax will be playing in the cards of the likes of The Caymans, Switzerlands and Lichtensteins.

Despite the unpleasant humid climate, the United Arab Emirates, which are also suffering from a burst real estate bubble, are still very eager to build out Dubai as the fourth financial centre in the world as a hub between Europe and the Asian markets. Initiatives from the Brown Administration will only contribute to a further brain drain from the UK to that country.

This is certainly not the way forward to restore the banking / financial services industry, which in the UK represents 20%+ of GDP. Compared to the US, where that number is only 6 to 8 %, this is a number to be reckoned with.

A more sensible and solid way to stimulate consumer spending would be the introduction of a flat tax system. In this case all household incomes (with an exemption of households of e.g. four would not pay taxes until their annual income would rise above $ tbd) would be taxed by a single marginal tax rate of for example 19 %.

A first advantage would be that it simplifies the tax system. Instead of needing a tax advisor helping you through all the exceptions and filling in hundreds of forms, the tax form would be reduced to a simple post card size form, with on the left hand side the labour income and the right hand side business and or capital income.

Secondly it would avoid double taxation of savings. Registration rights, dividends etc. would be cancelled.

The biggest advantage would be the substantial impact on consumer behaviour and economic growth. Economists from the Heritage Foundation’s Centre for Data Analysis, Dale Jorgenson from Harvard, and think tank The Hoover Institute did research on the subject of growth contribution of a Flat Tax system.

Adopting e.g. a 17 % flat tax system would lead to significant improvement of economic activity in the first 10 years:

• 3.8 million new jobs would be created
• $ 550 billion extra GDP (current US GDP is approximately 13,000 billion)
• Increase in personal savings by 50 %
• Nations capital stock would rise by $ 1.3 trillion

All these factors are desperate elements every economy is looking for. A large part of the 5 million jobs that were lost during the current crisis would be recovered. GDP would rise by roughly 4 %. The savings ratio would be considerably boosted for a nation which is currently buried under debt. A small part of the capital destruction would be restored.

Critics argue this is an unfair system because it would further punish the middle class which is carrying the majority of the burden. The question is whether the critics have already wondered how unfair the current system is. Their calculations invariably take the adjusted gross incomes reported by taxpayers as if they were their true incomes. They fail to come to grips with the shocking fact that over half of all business income never shows up in anyone’s adjusted gross income.

Because the critics are unaware of the additional revenue available from effectively taxing business income at a rate of let’s say 17- 19 percent, they examine flat- rate plans that extract excessive revenue from working people and find that those plans put a heavy burden on middle income wage and salary earners. They do not consider the option of raising a suitable amount of revenue from business income; instead, they propose to continue the current practice of generating almost all revenue by taxing wages and salaries. By letting business income continue to go virtually untaxed, they perpetuate the unfairness of the current tax system.

Bottom line, apart from the potential loss of talent, in times of deflationary pressure it is ludicrous to hamper consumer spending and reduce disposable income by increasing taxes. The UK and possibly the US (as President Obama has similar thoughts on this in order to balance their budget deficits again) will pay a very expensive price for this down the road.

Tuesday 7 April 2009

Debriefing the G20 summit: Ceci n'est pas une pipe!

Now that we have the G20 behind us, it remains to be seen how long this market can drive on the optimism and momentum that has been generated by that summit. The question remains whether the optimism that was present among the G20 leaders was prescient at best, or premature at worst.

When we scroll through the numbers we notice that a lot of packages were already committed to long before the start of the summit and should have been priced into the market last month. So from the $ 1.1 trillion headline there was a lot of “old money” in it.

The $ 1.1 trillion which was sold by Gordon Brown during the press conference as “additional money to support and restore credit, growth and jobs” is misleading. Let’s vivisect this spectacular amount:

• $ 500 bln are additional contributions to the IMF,
• $ 100 bln to the Multilateral Development Bank (MDB)
• $ 250 bln of Special Drawing Rights which the IMF can create itself
• $ 250 bln for international trade finance

Of the $ 500 bln promised to the IMF only $ 250 bln will be transferred immediately and this has already been confirmed by Canada, the EU, Japan and Norway before the summit. Japan’s contributions to this were already communicated back in November. The remainder has been left open and will be decided upon in future G20 summits.

As Capital Economics is arguing, it remains very unclear to which extent the UK and US are going to contribute to this action plan. Since it is money transferred to the IMF, quota’s need to be respected. If these were to be followed, the US might have to contribute up to 17% or $ 85 bln, and the UK 5% or $ 25 bln. Japan’s $ 100 bln promise exceeds their quote of 6% by far, so the UK and or US could try to argue their contribution to be less then their fair share.

$ 100 bln to the MDB will be spread over three years and to be divided between:

• The African Development Bank
• The Asian Development Bank
• The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
• The Inter-American Development Bank Group

Per EM (Emerging Market) country only a $ 2-3 bln will or could be used for additional aid. Considering the impaired situation of EM, this amount is like a drop in the bucket.

The $ 250 bln of SDR’s will be printed by the IMF and can be considered as quantitative easing but organised by the IMF on a more global scale. However it will be less effective as the QE applied by the Fed-BoE-SNB-BoJ, as this money is stored on the bank accounts of the members, each according to their quotas. Only a fraction will be injected directly to the EM countries (approximately $ 100 bln).

Last but not least there is the $ 250 bln committed to get international trading back going. This will be spread over the next two years. So once again this is not $ 250 bln that will be injected into the system immediately. More importantly the majority of this will have to come from the private sector. The only explicit pledge at the moment is $ 3-4 bln for an aid programme managed by the World Bank.

The only way to get international trade going again is to do something about the Letter of Credit markets. As long as banks are not going to issue LoC’s commercial trade will remain anaemic.

Adding up all these numbers gives a less spectacular amount than the $ 1.1 trillion. It does not even come close to $ 250 bln of new money which would supposedly be injected immediately into the system

There are though a number of positive signs such as the commitment to prevent protectionist measures and stricter regulation, but an important test will be to which extent they translate all these well intended commitments into national legislation. It will be interesting to see regarding the protectionism issue whether the Obama Administration is going to withdraw their “Buy America” Act. (aka ARRA).

As far as regulation is concerned, we are already noticing two-three days after the summit a deep split between continental Europe and the UK. Britain opposes any form of authority given to a centralised European Regulator transformed from a national level.

Also the Council of Systemic Risk creates a split between the member states. The ECB under supervision of President Trichet is all in favour to bring this under its umbrella. Unfortunately, the UK is vetoing this and considers this too a breach of the sovereignty principle.

As you can see the G20 was all about the package and verbal spinning to talk the stock markets up. Even FED Chairman Bernanke on Friday repeated his comments from March, that he is seeing greens seeds of recovery in the economy. Of course one can understand they are not going to create more panic to the public, but it is a big gamble.

Very soon we will need much better data to confirm this optimism in the markets. If not, risk aversion could return very quickly. Many global central banks only began with QE measures in full force during March and so far the jury is still out on their efficiency. Lending remains difficult and as the slow bleed in global labour markets continues, investment demand is now also falling rapidly, regardless of credit availability. The actual trough in growth may be approaching, but it is still sufficiently far away to halt fresh risk-seeking flows as economic performance fails to impress. The volatiliy index (VIX) came down gradually but is still trading at substantial above normal levels indicating further nervousness in the market.

It will be very interesting to see whether we already get through earning season, kicking off tonight after NY close with Alcoa but the outlook on banks is already weighing on sentiment. Certainly Mr. Mike Mayo from Calyon reiterated that the problems in the banking sector are from over.

“While certain mortgage problems are farther along, other areas are likely to accelerate, reflecting a rolling recession by asset class," He continues by saying "New government actions might not help as much as expected, especially given that loans have been marked down to only 98 cents on the dollar, on average." We are also worried by about $ 7 trillion outstanding bank loans in private plus commercial real estate and consumer lending that the public private partnership does not focus on and will not fix. Mr. Mayo expressed similar concerns regarding those loans.

An interesting paper on this subject was published last week by John Hussman. (See link attached.) It describes very well the current situation and recommendations to get the banking sector out of this vicious circle.

http://www.hussmanfunds.com/wmc/wmc090330.htm


So we remain highly sceptical on the current rally and G20 hype and would use Magritte’s famous painting to characterize the whole situation: “Ceci n’est pas une pipe.”